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CREDIT POLICY AND RENT-SEEKING AMONG
SMALL BANKS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
I/. Bruce J. Tolentino
In recent years, the focus of rural finance research has dramati-
cally shifted from the narrow "farm-level impact of credit" to a
broader concern which is the efficient operation of the rural finan-
cial market as a whole. 1 In such a wider context, dominant views
on the financial intermediary's role also change. In particular, small
rural bankers are increasingly being perceived lessassimple, one-way,
passive conduits of funds from lenders to farmers, and more as ac-
tive, profit-maximizing firms and producers of loans and financial
services (Von Pischke 1978). As active participants in the rural fi-
nancial market, the small bankers'activities are nonneutral factors
in the rural economy. However, their profit-maximizing activities
are conditioned by policy: to the extent that policy affects the
bankers' costs and revenues, then ultimately policy determines the
flow and level of funds in the rural economy.
This paper attempts to model some aspects of the small LDC
bankers' profit-maximizing, decision-making processesin responseto
a range of policy actions. Part i lists the assumptions employed in
the model and develops an initial exposition of the model in the ab-
senceof policy-engendered incentives or constraints. Parts2 through
4 modify the initial model given the operation of policies affecting
the bankers' costs and revenues, including: (a) cost-of-fund subsi-
dies, (b) the allocation of relending funds, (c) government equity
participation, (d) loan allocation quotas, and finally, (e) interest rate
ceilings.
Fellow, Center for Policy and DevelopmentStudies,University of the
Philippines at LosBa_os.Referto my Ph.D.dissertation,"Economies of Scale,
RelativeEfficiency and BankingPolicy: An Applicationto the Philippines,"
submittedto the Universityof Hawaii,August1986
1. For comprehensive reviewson theshift in the"mindset" of ruralfinancial
marketresearchers, seeDavidandMeyer (1979)for the initial, narrowviewand
Adams(1983)for the"new view".
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Assumptions in the Model As a first approximation, the fol-
lowing features apply: (a) the market is competitive, and therefore
the price for output is determined in the market, and is seen by the
representative, price-taking firm as average revenue AR (equal to
marginal revenue, MR). The prices of inputs into the firm's produc-
tion function are determined in the market for factors; (b) the
banker operates as a profit-maximizer; (c) there is no deliberate mal-
feasance on the part of either the banker or his customers/borro-
wers; (d) the monitoring of banking activities by the regulatory
agencies is efficient; and (e) finally, the banker does not expend ef-
forts or costs to secure that policy extends to his operations and he is
thus benefited from it. 2 The assumptions of "no malfeasance" in (c)
and efficient regulation in (d) will be relaxed in stages in the latter
part of this section.
The Policies. The specific policy measures to be considered in the
model, as illustrated below in stages, affect the operations of the
small banker via his cost and/or revenue structures. First to be
considered are those that effectively reduce the banker's cost of
operations: (a) reductions on the rediscount rate charged by the
Central Bank on loans made to qualifying banks; (b) subsidies on
both fixed and variable costs of operation; and (c) government equi-
ty contributions. Those policies affecting the banker revenues are
those establishing interest rate ceilings and lending quotas.
The Lender's Optimum Without .Subsidies
Initial examination focuses on the case of the lender operating
without special support from the government. His costs are deter-
mined as follows:
(]) C=rzL 1 +r2(qL1)+H+m/L1(l +q)]
where:
2. In other words, the small banker does not engagein "directly unproduc-
tive profit-seeking" activities in order to securelicenseand the like which entitle
him to incentive and subsidy support. Of course, to the extent that directly
unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities are undertaken, such activities
increasethe banker's costsand are alsoultimately dissipatedasdeadweight losses
to society. See Bhagwati (1984).14 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
C = total cost,
r1 = constant, averageopportunity cost of"own" funds,
Lt = loan funds generated by the lender from internal - "own"
souFees,
r2 = rediscount, rate charged by the Central Bank,
q = government-set proportion of funds eligible for redis-
counti ng,
H = fixed costs of loan handling, and
m = per unit variable costs of loan handling, broadly defined
to include monitoring and other.risk-reducing activities.
The lender operates to at leastcover his averagevariable cost out
of revenues, R. R is simply the product of the market rate of interest
i* and the total amount loaned out, LI(I + q).. His profit _ris the
difference between his revenues and cost, and will beat a maximum
where the first-order conditions hold as:
a_rla/L 7(1 + q)] = aR/a[L i (1 + q)]
(2) - aClafL (1+q)] =o
or,
MR = MC
when the slopes of the total cost and total revenue curvesare parallel
orequal. The above unrestricted, prepolicy implementation optimum
is illustrated in Figure 1. In the upper panel, the lender
equates marginal revenue and marginal cost and lends out the opti-
mal amount Of loans L*. Above /-*,the distance between the cost
and revenue curvesis at its maximum, and thus the lender is maximi-
zing profit, equal to the area below the linear revenue line and above
the convex (upward) cost function. In the lower panel, the lender
responds to the market-determined price-interest rate i*, and equates
his MC with i*, which is his marginal revenue. In theprocess he gene-
rates profits, represented by the rectangle above average cost and
below the price line, i*qnm. Since the lender operates along his MC
curve, and since he will not supply Ioansat interest rates below mi-
nimum AC when he can no longer cover at least his average variable
cost, his effective supply curve is his MC curve above minimum AC.
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Policies Affecting Lending Costs
The Allocation of Special Funds for Re/ending, and the Associa-
ted Subsidies for Costs Related to the Re/ending Funds. One of the
most popular and common programs(or set of programs)implemen-
ted by governments under the "supply-leading" strategy of rural fi-
nance is to allocate funds to banks for relending to some identified
"priority" activity, crop or agricultural product. The allocation of
the relendingfunds is often accompaniedby other incentivesfor par-
ticipation, including:
(a) lower interest rates on relending funds; (b) lower rediscountin_
rates on loan paper produced from relendingfunds; (c) greater pro-
portions of loan papers eligible for rediscounting;and (d) subsidies
on both fixed and variable costs of loan handling like training for
staff, fees, licenses, permits and taxes. The rationale for all the in-
centives is usually that the specialized programs requiring credit are
relatively more risky or monitoring-intensive and are thus more
costly. Without the incentives it isbelieved that theseac, tiviti.es will-
not beableto securethe credit that they "deserve."
With the incentives,the lender'scost function becomes:
,(3) C e = rI LI + r2 (qL1) + r3L2
+ [r2(1 -s) qL2]+ (1 - h)HTOLENTINO: CREDIT POLICY AMONG SMALL BANKS 17
+ rn[L 1(1 + q) J
￿[(1 - n)m] [L 2(l ￿q)/
where:
L2 = relendingfunds,
r3 = the rate on relendingfunds,
s = discountgivenon the rediscount rate chargedon loanpa-
persgeneratedfrom relendingfunds,
h = per unit subsidyon #,
n = discount (subsidy)onvariable handlingcosts,
and the other variablesare defined as before. There isoften a condi-
tion that the participating banks may only avail themselves of the
subsidies s,/7, and n so long as their size, represented by their total





The ra*_ionalebehind the size criteria implies a popularly-held no-
tion that there is a positive relation between size, efficiency and pro-
fitability, and-therefore, support should generally be limited to small,
"infant" banks. Furthermore, the "social goals" of development
funding are often thought to be of greater import than lender profi-
tability. So long as lending to the needy target sectors is accomplish-
ed, then the subsidies are a necessary cost of development.
The effect of the subsidies are illustrated in Figure 2. The total
cost function shifts downward, and so do the associated marginal and
average cost functions. Given fixed prices, the lower total and per
unit costs result in greater profits. However, due to the criteria limi-
ting the granting of subsidies only to banks of size 2
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FIGURE 2
THE OPTIMUM OF THE SMALL BANKER, GIVEN SUBSIDIES,
A LOAN ALLOCATION QUOTA AND AN INTEREST RATE CEILING
ITOLENTINO: CREDIT POLICY AMONG SMALL BANKS 19
and smaller, the post-subsidy, effective total cost function C,e aswell
as the subsidized average and marginal cost curvesAC e and MCe, are
:2 :2
kinked at the loan output level ,_ Limax Under size _ Limax , the
: /=1 /=1
banker operates along the subsidized marginal and average cost
curves MC' and_AC'. Beyond the maximum size point, the banker
operatesalongthe unsubsidizedAC and MC curves.
Policies Principally Affecting Lender's Revenues
The lender'srevenuesmay be representedas the product of the
interest rate and the quantity of loansgivenout. For simplicity, it is
assumed that the lender's revenuesare.generated principally from
loan operations,,and revenuesfrom other banking serviceslike safety
deposit rentals, transfer and trust servicesarezero or negligible.Total
revenue R istherefore:





R = revenue, and
i* = the single market lending rate,
and the other variablesare asdefined in previous sections.
Lending Quotas. Often regulation is enacted which decrees that
a minimum prolsortion of loan funds must be allocated to agricul-
ture or some.other "policy favored" sector. The rationale behind
such regulation is that lenders, if left on their own, will not lend to
these sectors which often pose greater levelsof risk, and thus require
more loan monitoring and handling inputs. Now suppose policy is
enacted with the purpose of diverting more funds to agriculture, by
decree that at least some proportion a of all loan funds be allocated
to agricultural loans. Where there are no differences in the rates
charged for agriculture and those charged for nonagricultural loans,
i e._there is a single market rate, then the revenue function will be:
2 2
(5) R=i*[a(T.,L/ (1 +q')')] +i*[(]--a)(T.,Li{.1 +q))].
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where:
a -- proportion of total loan funds required to be allocated
to agriculture.
With the quota on loans to the priority sector in effect, and
where the interest rates that may be charged in each market are
equal, the lender's revenues are equal to those without the quota.
However, to the extent that loans to the priority sector are indeed
riskier or monitoring-intensive, then the lender's costs will rise, and
his profits, given unchanging revenues,will fall.
Interest Rate Ceilings. The imposition of ceilings on lending rates
on loans to favored sectors is often thought to be a necessarycom-
plement to the allocation measure, since the higher costs of handling
associated with agricultural loans would cause lenders to charge agri-
cultural borrowers correspondingly higher rates. Therefore, to "pro-
tect" agricultural borrowers, a ceiling say, imax on agricultural loan
rates is imposed. Given that ceiling, the lender's revenue function
now becomes:
2






R" = effective total revenue with interest rate ceilings, and
irnox = maximum lending rate on loans to agriculture.
Since imax, < i*, then Rt < R. Revenues at given loan levels would
be lower. With unchanging cbsts, profits will be lower. To the extent
that loan handling costs on loans to the favored sector are higher,
then profits will go down further.
3,
The Small Banker's Optimum Given Subsidies, a Loan Allocation
Quota and an interest Rate Ceiling
The cost-reducing and revenue-controlling regulatory measures
as enumerated above combine to form a powerful package of incen-
tives which largely shape the actions of the profit-maximizing len-TOLENTINO: CREDIT POLICY AMONGSMALL BANKS 21
der. The small banker's optimum, given the incentives and controls,•
is illustrated in the discussions following.
In panel (a) of Figure 2, total revenue is a straight line from the
origin R, the product of the loansgiven out/- and the market inte-
rest rate /*. With the policy package, the applicable total revenue
curve isRe, the product of L and the effective interest rateie, where:
•le __Re￿L,
and Re is determined as in Equation (6).
The horizontal axis shows the total of loan funds available to the
small lender, made up of the various sources of such funds and their
increasethrough redisc0unting and relending. In the absenceof the
policy package,the banker would operate along the total cost curve
HC, and would find his profit-maximizing loan portfolio to be of
total size L*. With the operation of the incentives, the effective cost
curve is the lowerH'C; or (1 - h)HabC, which is kinked at the out-
2
put level _; LImax where the subsidiesmay no longer be availed of. i=1
2
At _; LimaXandbeyond,the banker mustagainoperate alongthe higher
/=.1
2
cost function. To induce the banker to move beyond _; Li max, he i=1
must receive compensation for the loss of the excess revenue =
subsidy, represented by the area under R' and above H' C, •lessthe
area under Re and above the prepolicy packagecost curveHC.
In terms of the marginaland averagecostsin panel (b), the ban-
ker would,operate along AC and MC in the absenceof the incentive
package. Given i*, the banker will equate his marginal and average
costs and produce the loans L*, earning profits equal to the rec-
tangle below the average revenue curve AR = i* and above the
average cost curve AC. With the operation of the incentives, however,
the banker's average and marginal cost curves shift to A_ and MCe.
However, sincethe banker cannot enjoy the cost-reducing incentives
2
from the government at outputs above g L.max his effective AC
• i=1 t
2
and MC curves will be kinked at the points above _;L.r'ax . In order
i=1 z
2
to induce him to move beyond Z;L/max, he must be compensated i=122 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
for the loss of the additional profits (subsidy) that the move will en-
tail.
CaseA: The Small Banker's Optimum
with Effective Monitoring
As has been described, the small lender's optimum presumesthat
the monitoring of its operations by the regulatory authorities -
among them the Central Bank - is effective. That is, the prescribed
•minimum proportion of total funds loaned out is indeed allocated to
agricultural loans at interest rates no higher than the ceiling rate. The
banker will lend out to the favored sector only as much as he is
forced to, since to exceed the minimum would result in greater costs,
lower revenues and profits. In this situation, the level of the ceiling
lending rate and the maximum size criteria beyond which a small
banker may no longer avail himself of subsidies become important
policy variables which determine the banker's actions. In the discuss-
ion that follows, the size criteria are assumedasgivenand the effects
of changes in the maximum interest rate chargeable on loans to the
favored sector imax , are shown.
The lender •responds to the effective, lending rate ie, which is
determined by the combination of the market rate and the ceiling
rate. The ceiling rate may beadjusted by the Central Bank. As shown
in Figure 2, a ceiling rate that is set quite low, resulting in the effec-
tive rate in the range
ie < minimum AC
will result in the banker being•unable to cover his costs of operation
despite the availability of cost subsidies, and thus lead to a shut-
down,
Le =0.
The banker will refuse to lend his own money and, thus, the loan
funds provided by the government will not be allocated also. The low
ceiling rate will therefore discourage rather than encourage business.
When the ceiling rate isset such that:
minimum AC _ f < n,TOLENTINO: CREDIT POLICY AMONG SMALL BANKS 23
then the banker will operate along hissubsidizedmarginalcost curve
and loanout:
2
L'__ Le ___; L;m°x - - i--1
Therefore, the small bankers' optimum may beachievedat a size
under the maximum possiblesubsidizedsize.
Finally, when the ceiling rate isset suchthat:
n;_l _ <0,
then the banker will be able to operate along the vertical portion of
the kinked postpolicy averageand marginal cost curvesACf and MCr,
and produce:
2
Le = _, L .mox
i=1 '
The banker is now constrained from expansion by the size limit-
2 2
ation Z; L/max To expand beyond Y_, L.max would causethe
!=1 " i=1 I
banker to lose the subsidies granted by l_heCentral Bank. He will be
forced to operate along the higher, unsubsidized portions of the
ayerageand marginalcurves.
CaseB: The Small Bomber's Optimum
With Ineffective Monitoring
In the setting described above, as illustrated in Figure 2, the
lender's revenues are indeed reduced by the combined policies of
lendingquotasand rateceilings.Also, the lender'scostsareeffectively
cut by the subsidyand incentivestructure. This result, however, as-
sumes that the prescribed minimum proportion of'loan funds is
indeed tent to the target low-interest borrowers. When monitoring
by the regulatory agenciesof the banker's operations is poor, as is
inevitably the case in most developingcountries, the banker isoften
able to divert a greater proportion of his.loan funds to unrestricted-24 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
interest, higher-earninginstruments. Thus, the effective interest rate
by which he operates rises. His revenuesthus also rise. These in-
creasesapproach the limit of the unrestricted market interest rate
and the associated free-market revenue:
i e and --> i *,
Re _ R*.
The small banker is also encouraged to acquire the maximum
possible allocation of loan funds from the government, so that he
can maximize his placements in the higher-earning markets. In the
context of Equation (6), the banker acts to reduce the size of a, so
as to earn more revenues from relatively more funds in the higher-
interest market.
The result of the diversion of the agricultural loan funds to
higher-interest instruments may be seen in Figure 2 as a counter-
clockwise rotation of the Recurve, approaching the unrestricted
R'curve. Thus, there will be greater profits given costs. As was
already demonstrated in the previous section, at effective interest
rates at n and above, the banker will acessloan funds up to the
limit of 2
, _,, Li re°x, i=1
Ineffective Monitoring:. "Float Stratagems': The banker may pre-
serve or even raise his revenues by resorting to timing-dependent
stratagems, including:
1) delaying the release.of loan funds to borrowers, and in the
interim investing the loan funds in the unrestricted, and therefore
higher-earning nonagricultural credit market - i.e., "float" strate-
gies. In such a manner the banker is able to raise the effective in-
terest rate and thus his revenues.
2) giving emphasis to.speedy turnaround loan processing, which
minimizes the period within which the loan is held by the low-
paying borrower, and maximizes the period within which the loan
funds may again be floated at higher rates.
These factors induce the profit-maximizing lender to choose
borrowers by criteria which will fulfill the lender's float objectives:
highly-liquid borrowers, borrowers willing to receive loans late and
pay up early, and projects of very short duration. A greater propor-
tion .of the total loan furLds is also concentrated among a smallerTOLENTINO: CREDIT POLICY AMONG SMALL BANKS 25
number of borrowers, those which meet both the lender's explicit
and implicit lending criteria. These criteria, in effect, screenout the
very classof borrowers in behalf of whom the regulations were
enacted.
Finally, to the extent that the loansdiverted to the unrestricted
loan market incur lower costsrelated to loan handling and monito-
ring, then the lender'stotal costsare further reducedand hisprofits
increased. In terms of equation (4), h andm, and therefore C _, fall.
Equity Contributions By Government
Finally, there is need to examine the policy of governmentin
encouragingthe organization of new banksand the expansionof ex-
isting banks by providing equity contributions. This is done to in-
crease the level and flow of funds through the financial system,
particularly to those sectorsconsideredas"priority areas." Suchan
equity contribution is often made availableonly up to some maxi-
mum, usually equal to that already internally-generated by the
lender. Given the contribution, the lender's pre-policy costfunction
(1.5) may be modified to become:
'(7) C_ =rlL 7 +r2 [q(L i +L3) ]
+H*m[(L I +L3)(1 +q)].
where:
L3 =.the equity contribution by government.
and, La = LI,
La _ L3max,
and the other variablesare defined asabove. L 3 max issomemaxi-
mum to equity contributions set by government policy. For sim-
plicity, the equity contribution of the government is considered
costles$to the lender and is thus not explicitly included in ex-
pression(3).
With equity from the government,the lender'scapacity to lend
has been increasedin two ways: from the equity-sourcedincreasein
loan ,funds,L3, and the increase in rediscounted funds, since the
proportion eligible for rediscountinghasincreasedfrom:26 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
q (Ll + L2),
to




Given fixed prices, the lender's total costs, revenuesand profits must
also increase.•However, the increases in costs and revenuesare not
directly proportiona|. Revenues increase faster than costs, since the
equity funds are costless to the bankers. The equity, in effect, is a
• "free" loan from the government. As shown in Figure 3, the lender's
supply function of loans, or the marginal cost curve above average
variable cost, shifts rightward and downward. Given the conditions
in the illustration, •the equity contribution shifts fhe lender's supply
curve from MinAC e pno MCe to MinACe'pnoMC _'.
All Subsidies and Equities Considered. When the equity contri-
bution of government of Stage1 isconsidered along with the various
incentives of Stage 2, the cost function of the lender is finally:
C
(S + E) = r I L1 + r3 L3 + r2 [q(L I + L2) ]
+ [ (l - s) r2] /L3(1 Y-q)/ + (l -17) H
(8) + m [L,(1 +q) + L2 (l+q)]
+ (1 -.n) m[L 3 (1 + q)j.
Conclusion. The simple model sketched above showsthe profit-
maximizing decision-making process of the small banking firm in
response to policy. Many of these policies have been enacted in va-
rious less developed countries over at least the past two decade%all
with the purpose of increasing the level and flow of loans to produ-
cers, particularly farmers. However, the experience with such prog-
rams has generally been disappointing. The increases in loan use, if
any, have been much less than expected. Central Banks and outside
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AN ALLOCATION QUOTA, AN INTERESTRATE CEILING AND
AN EQUITY CONTRIBUTION FROM GOVERNMENT28 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
operations of small banks and small bankers have been unwilling and
unable to gain independence from external support.
The model sketched in this paper shows that, when the small
banker is viewed as the profit-maximizing financial firm that it is,
it is clear that the small banker has little incentive to rid itself of
Central Bank support. In the subsidy and incentive-dominated policy
structure, the small banker finds it more profitable to generate its
revenues via government support, and not from its loan portfolio.
The pyramiding structure of incentives and subsidies flowing from
the Central Bank to the small bankers provides virtually guaranteed,
minimal-cost and low-risk revenue for small-bankers. Thus any
income from loan operations is incidental to the process of gener-
ating rents from the subsidies and incentives.
If the subsidy and incentive structures remain in place, then
recent efforts exerted by many LDC governments to revitalize their
rural financial markets via the removal of ceilings on interest rates
may have effects completely different from those expected. The re-
moval of interest rate ceilings will only maximize the rents that small
bankers may extract from their operations, as they will now be able
to charge maximum rates on their loans. Therefore the deregulation
of interest rates must be accompanied by the dismantling of the sub-
sidy and incentive structure, in order to encourage bankers to enlarge
their loan operations, and to look upon their portfolio as their
primary source of revenue, the link between banker's revenues and
government subsidies must bebroken and reoriented to loans.
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